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CHAPTER ONE 
1. General Overview of the Study 
At the heart of the formation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 lies the ultimate goal to 
promote and maintain international peace and security.1 With the scourge of the Second 
World War still freshly in mind and the apparent failure of the League of Nations2
 
 to prevent 
it, the framers of the UN Charter were careful not to create another toothless organization. 
Chapters V, VI, VII, VIII, and XII of the UN Charter established and mandated the UN 
Security Council (SC) to, inter alia, take the primary responsibility in championing the 
promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. Among other things, the 
Security Council is to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate 
armaments; and to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or a breach of it or acts of 
aggression and to recommend what actions should be taken.  
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have largely remained the main focus of disarmament 
efforts during the last half of the twentieth century. The risk of nuclear, biological, or 
chemical weapons proliferation engulfed the attention of the international community, in 
particular the SC, to the extent that implied that not solely focusing on these weapons at the 
time, would be a costly mistake. Indeed, the threat of proliferation of these weapons still 
remains even today. However, the threats posed by the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SALW) equally give cause to worry and deserve the same attention being paid to 
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. To be sure, not since the days of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki has there been any recorded history of someone killed through the deliberate use of 
any of the WMD. Yet, almost all of the conflicts fought in the immediate aftermath of the 
Cold War and since have largely been fought with these SALW including virtually all of the 
                                                 
1 Article 1 of the United Nations Charter 
2 Schweigman (2001) p.31 
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internal wars that have plagued Africa since 1990.3
 
 While states have established 
international norms in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation and banned chemical and 
biological weapons and anti-personnel land-mines, there is no such framework of norms and 
standards to eliminate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. 
The scope of arms in this study is limited to small arms and light weapons which constitute a 
sub-category of conventional weapons that can be carried by one person or a small crew. The 
UN classifies them as follows: Small arms include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles 
and carbines, assault rifles, submachine guns and light machine guns. Light weapons are said 
to cover: heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, 
portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, portable launchers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft 
missile systems and mortars of less that 100mm calibre.4
 
 For the purposes of this study, the 
terms ‘small arms’, or ‘small arms and light weapons’ or the abbreviation ‘SALW’ will be 
used interchangeably to denote both classes of weapons. 
More than 1300 people are estimated killed each day as a direct consequence of the use of 
arms and many more are forced to flee from their homes, raped, tortured, or maimed.5 More 
than 740,000 people are estimated killed through armed violence each year, both directly and 
indirectly, with approximately two-thirds of these deaths occurring outside war zones.6
 
 Illicit 
arms are also used in terrorist acts, organized crime, and other clandestine activities.  Kofi 
Annan, the former UN Secretary General emphasized the centrality of small arms to the 
distress and conflict experienced in developing countries during the 1990s. He wrote; 
The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapon systems-and in 
most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated 
                                                 
3 Hazdra (2007) p.15  
4 UNGA Res. A/52/298, 27 August 1997 
5 Small Arms Survey (2001) p.1 
6 UNGA Doc. A/C.1/63/L.39, 17 October 2008 
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Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, 
indeed, could well be described as “weapons of mass destruction”.7
 
   
This study seeks to analyze what role the Security Council ought to play with regards to the 
illicit global arms trade and its adverse effects on the peace since the Council has the 
‘primary responsibility’ in the maintenance of international peace and security. In the report 
of the General Secretary on small arms to the Security Council on September 20, 2002, he 
underscores that preventing, combating and eliminating the uncontrolled spread in small 
arms and light weapons constitutes one of the key tasks of the Security Council in 
discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.8 In the same report, the General Secretary acknowledged that the spread of illicit 
small arms and light weapons is a global threat to human security and human rights. The 
point of reference in this study is the precedence set by the Security Council on countering 
the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in its resolutions 1373 (2001) and 
1540 (2004) respectively.9
 
  
1.1 Research Questions 
 
There are considerable legal, moral and political questions concerning the role of the UN 
Security Council in dealing with the threats pose by the illicit global trade in SALW. 
However, this study attempts to answer two lingering questions: 
 
1. Does the illicit global trade in small and light weapons qualify as a threat to 
international peace and security under Article 39 of the UN Charter and the 
subsequent practices of the Security Council? 
 
                                                 
7 UNGA Res. A/54/2000, 3 April 2000 
8 UNSC Res. S/1053/2002, 20 September 2002  
9 UNSC Res. S/Res/1373/2001, 28 September 2001 and UNSC Res. S/1540/2004, 28 April 2004 
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2. Should the illicit trade in arms be determined as a threat to peace and security, what 
enforcement measure(s) would be available to the Security Council? 
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
 
The objectives of this study are to undertake a concerted analysis of the mandate and 
practices of the SC to point to its jurisdiction over the current illicit global trade in small and 
light weapons and to seek its immediate action. Firstly, an analysis will be done on whether 
or not the illicit global trade in small and light weapons qualifies as a threat to international 
peace and security under Article 39 of the UN Charter and the practices of the SC. Secondly, 
in the past the Council has used its ‘legislative power’ to adopt two far-reaching resolutions 
(binding on all UN Member States) on countering the threats of terrorism and WMD.10
 
 
Further analysis would be carried out on the possibility for the Council to legislate again, this 
time, to counter the threat posed by the illicit arms trade to international peace and security.  
1.3 Methodology and Sources 
 
This study will combine both historical and legal approaches. The historical approach will be 
most appropriate for detailing the overview of the illicit global trade in arms. This approach 
will further be used to provide insights into the various issues which have been subsumed 
under the authority of the SC in the past. The legal approach will be appropriately used to 
facilitate the interpretation of the legal articles spelling the powers and functions, as well as 
the legalities of the UN Security Council’s practices. Legal sources such as relevant articles 
of the UN Charter and other legal resources, textbooks, specialists and general journals will 
be reviewed. Also, relevant NGO reports and appropriate websites will be resorted to. In this 
regard, recourse will be made to the text of relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1969 in the interpretation of the various legal materials.  
                                                 
10 Ibid 
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1.4 Delimitation and Structure of the Study 
This study has very limited specific objectives and focus, and it is structured in a way that 
keeps the study focused on addressing the two underlining questions. 
 
1.4.1 Delimitation 
This study will limit itself to the discussion on the interpretation by the Security Council of 
Articles 39, 40 and 41 of the UN Charter and its practices thereon as the scope of this study 
will not permit further extended discussion of all of its powers. This limitation is 
purposefully sustained to enable the discussion to be directed towards pointing to the legality 
and cogency in subsuming the illicit trade in arms under the authority of the SC as far as it 
affects international peace and security. The study will be further curtailed to the analysis of 
specific resources that underscore the harmful effects of the illicit trade in arms on the 
promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. The discussion on the role of 
the SC would be limited to the precedence set in resolutions 1373 and 1540 and the power of 
the Council to regard the threat posed by the illicit trade in arms as a threat to the peace and 
to take similar action 
 
1.4.2 Structure 
 
This study is organized around six chapters. Chapter one provides a general overview of the 
study: the introduction to the study; the research questions of the study; the objectives of the 
study; and the delimitation and structure of the study. Chapter two will mainly deal with the 
existing global arms trade: the global arms trade; legal and illicit trade in arms; and the 
human cost of the illicit trade in arms. Chapter three discusses the efforts to combat the illicit 
trade in arms: global, regional and national initiatives. Chapter four discusses the Security 
Council and maintenance of peace and security; functions, powers and practices of the 
Security Council under the UN Charter. Chapter five comprises the discussion and analysis 
of the two research questions underlining this study whereas chapter six provides the 
summary and conclusion of the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2. The Global Arms Trade and Its Human Cost 
The trade in SALW is neither a new profession nor is its human cost. However, it is only in 
the early 1990s that the de-stabilizing effect of the illicit transfer, accumulation and misuse of 
small arms and light weapons prompted a sustained international scrutiny on the arms trade. 
For centuries states have solely regulated the production, trade and transfer of these weapons 
within their own territories. But, the widespread nature of the violence wrought by SALW 
across the globe since the 90s is indicative of the global nature of the threats pose by the 
illicit arms trade and how states have failed to successfully regulate the trade in and transfer 
of SALW.  
 
2.1. The Global Trade in Arms 
The global arms trade is the main channel for the supply of weapons and munitions to 
governments for legitimate use including self-defense, peace-keeping and law enforcement. 
Yet, while many of the weapons and munitions used to commit violations will have been 
produced locally, the arms trade also supply guns, ammunitions, grenades, mortars and other 
weapons into the hands of irresponsible governments and other non-state actors, providing 
them the lifeline for warfare, repression, terrorism or violent crime. The illicit trade in SALW 
further provides the avenue through which cheap weapons are supplied to commit gross 
violation of international law, including human rights and humanitarian law.  
 
The global trade in SALW is a booming business. The small arms survey 2009, based on the 
UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database, suggests that the previous estimate of USD 4 
billion for the global authorized trade in SALW and their parts, accessories, and ammunitions 
in its 2006 edition, is a significant underestimate.11
                                                 
11 Small Arms Survey (2009) page 7 
  It is still extremely difficulty to exact a 
firm value on the global authorized arms trade because it is largely un-documented despite 
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greater reporting on firearms transfers. The information that is gathered from the few 
countries who dare report is at best spotty and imperfect. A number of others remain 
selective in the provision of information, issue misleading data, or do not report on their 
small arms transfers at all.12
 
  
2.1.1 The Various Shades of the Global Arms Trade 
On a continuum, the arms trade is undertaken in three markets: the legal, the illegal and the 
grey markets. The legal trade in arms involves the authorized trade that supply arms and 
munitions to governments, registered and recognized private security firms as well as the UN 
for the purposes of self-defense, peace-keeping and law enforcement. The small arms survey 
2006 pegs the lucrative legal trade in the three main categories of firearm- sporting and 
hunting shotguns and rifles, pistols and revolvers, and military firearms – at a totaled 
approximately USD 1.44 billion in 2006.13 The transfer is deemed legal, if it involves 
transfers that are authorized by at least one government.14
 
 The legal market is also commonly 
held to mean that the transfer process is responsibly carried out to avoid diversion into the 
illicit spheres. However, it is common knowledge that most of the weapons in the illicit 
spheres are diversions from legitimate sources. As with the trafficking of any commodity, 
money has become the driving force behind the SALW trade 
The illegal trade, on the other hand, takes place in an entirely illegitimate setting. What is 
characteristic about the illegal trade is that, the transfers are synonymous with ‘black market’ 
transfers and both terms refer to transfers that are not authorized by any government. The 
nature of the arms smuggle, largely shrouded in secrecy,  makes it even more difficult to 
know the global or even regional magnitude of the illegal arms transfers in terms of the 
overall dollar value or quantities of weapons. These illegal transfers usually involve private 
dealers and brokers who often have ties with various governments’ intelligence agencies and 
                                                 
12 Ibid, pages 8-9 
13 Small Arms Survey (2006) pages 7-8 
14 Small Arms Survey (2007) page 74 
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they knowingly violate the arms sales laws or policies of source, transit and/or recipient 
states for commercial gains.15 Also arms sales to governments or insurgents who have been 
placed under UN or applicable regional embargoes fall within the illegal trade. In a report by 
the UN panel studying light weapons trafficking, the panel noted that “networks operating 
internationally and other modes of transfer used for the illicit transfer of a variety of 
commodities are also used to transfer weapons. The techniques used involve smuggling, 
concealment, mislabeling and false documentation. To hide financial transactions, use is 
made of coded bank accounts protected by the secrecy laws of some financial institutions. To 
transport weapons, various methods are used, such as ships with bogus registration and flags 
of convenience”.16
 
   
The grey market sales are even more difficult to classify because of its overlapping nature 
between the legal and illegal markets. But the grey market transfers, which is also referred to 
as ‘irresponsible transfers’ are generally transfers that are authorized by a government, but 
are nevertheless doubtful legally, at least with reference to international law, or irresponsible 
in the sense of significant risk of diversion to unauthorized recipients.17 The main definitive 
characteristic of this trade is that almost all the weapons that end up here are those that are 
authorized but get diverted through dubious transfer procedures. Thus the weapons may 
begin as legally produced and purchased items but through several mediums, they are 
diverted into the illegal market. Often some of these mediums include purposeful lack of 
registration of legally authorized transfers, not properly tracking the transfer process, 
diversions, theft and capture of state security forces’ arms. The grey market is facilitated by 
arms brokers who are the ubiquitous and crucial players in the SALW trade.18
                                                 
15 Lumpe (2000) p.27 
 They are 
responsible for the transfers of several numbers of weapons for use by some irresponsible 
governments and insurgents.  
16 UNGA Res. A/52/298, 27 August 1997 
17 Small Arms Survey (2007) p.74 
18 Singh and Widome (2002) p.160 
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The term illicit transfers or illicit trade in arms is generally used to describe both the 
irresponsible and illegal transfers – the grey and black markets.  It is regarded as those that 
occur outside the control, or against the wishes, of exporting states.19 A 1996 UN report20 
provides a useful definition of the illicit trade in arms as being “that international trade in 
conventional arms, which is contrary to the laws of States and/or international law.” It thus 
implies that an illicit arms transfer would necessarily breach international law; the laws of 
exporting, transit, and/or importing states; or a combination of these laws.21 The weapons 
here are either unauthorized purchases or irresponsibly transferred or both. Estimates of the 
size of the illicit trade have ranged from 10-20 percent to 55 percent of the legal trade.22 The 
former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in an address in 2006 estimated the illicit trade in 
small arms to be worth USD 1billion annually.23
 
 Indeed, economic interests and weak state 
apparatus continue to underpin some of the main reasons for both the supply of arms to the 
illicit market and the demand for arms on the illicit market.   
2.2. The Human Cost of Arms Trafficking 
Small arms and light weapons continue to pose an ever increasing problem in almost every 
human endeavor. In conflict and post-conflict areas, the problem becomes even more 
daunting and monumental. Although there is no robust evidence that implicates SALW as a 
primary source of conflicts, they have very negative consequences on a society: they 
contribute to civil wars, crime, insecurity, even terrorism and they severely impede 
development, thus creating a vicious cycle of violence and underdevelopment. There are an 
estimated 600 million SALW in circulation worldwide. More than 50% of those weapons are 
not held by governments, but non-state actors and they are responsible for 85-90% of persons 
killed or injured globally.24
                                                 
19 Lumpe (2000) p.27 
 They are instrumental in the deaths of reportedly more than 
20 UNGA Res. A/51/42, 10 December 1996 
21 Ibid.  
22 Dyer and O’Callaghan (1998) p.3 
23 UN Doc. SG/SM/10537, DC/3031, 26 June 2006 
24 Hazdra (2007) p.8 
 14 
740,000 people annually – of which 300,000 people are killed by SALW in armed conflicts 
every year.25
 
 Analysts estimate the vast majority of these victims – up to 90% - to be 
civilians.  
The global proliferation of SALW increases both the lethality of violent encounters and the 
number of victims. Guns increasingly transform minor disputes into shootings and make it 
easier for children to become killers. The then Secretary General of the UN, Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, while presenting his state of the world address on the occasion of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the UN in 1995, became the first major world figure to sound the alarm about 
a new global threat: the spread and misuse of SALW.26
 
 Almost two years later, the Canadian 
Foreign Minister, Axworthy, in a speech to the UN General Assembly on 25 September 
1997, reiterated the effects of small arms among civilians: 
Land mines are not the only complex, cross-cutting problems to be addressed if 
we are to reduce or prevent conflicts. All too often it is small arms, rather than 
the weapons systems targeted by disarmament efforts, that cause the greatest 
bloodshed today. In the hands of terrorists, criminals and the irregular militia and 
armed bands typical of internal conflicts, these are the true weapons of mass 
terror.27
 
 
No region, no country and nobody is immune from the devastating consequences of the illicit 
trade in small arms and light weapons. The SALW trade is one of those rare issues whose 
effects are not confined to a specific segment of society, nor to a specific country or region, 
or to a specific socio-economic or ethnic group. The trade has enabled and wrought terror 
and carnage across the globe. Perhaps no area of the world has been more drastically affected 
by the small arms trade than Africa.28
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
 While the accumulation of these weapons by 
themselves did not cause the conflicts in Africa, it is estimated that almost 90% of the 
26 Laurence (2002) p.193 
27 UN Press Release GA/9453, 25 September 1997 
28 Singh and Widome (2002) p.160 
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conflicts fought in Africa since the 90s escalated to disturbing proportions due to easily 
available SALW in the region mostly through the illicit market.29
 
  
Counting the human cost of the illicit trade in arms is endless. The Program of Action 
adopted during the ‘UN Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All 
its Aspect’ neatly sums up some of the possible negative consequences associated with the 
proliferation of SALW. These include: increasing the intensity of contemporary conflicts; 
diminishing the security of vulnerable groups such as women and children or refugee and 
internally displaced persons; increasing the violence associated with large-scale criminal 
activity (and the concomitant burden of the criminal justice system); eroding development 
gains and the prospects for socio-economic development; threatening humanitarian relief 
operations and workers; and increasing the public health burden associated with firearms 
violence.30
 
 For decades these negative consequences of arms trafficking have been with us, 
increasingly diminishing the prospects of living in a secured and peaceful world. There is, 
however, yet to be a more globally coordinated comprehensive effort to forestall the 
debilitating effect of arms trafficking on humanity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Hazdra (2007) p.31 
30 Small Arms Survey (2002) p.228 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. Combating the Illicit Trade in Arms 
For decades the dangers pose to peace, security and development efforts through arms 
trafficking have being with us but the political will needed to tackle this issue has been slow 
at coming. Initially, the issue was regarded as a solely domestic issue while major 
conventional weapons have been addressed as central issues in international relation.31 
However, during the mid-1990s, policymakers around the world started to target each of the 
links in the chain with dozens of unilateral, bilateral, regional and global initiatives – albeit 
with varying degrees of seriousness.32 In general, the weaknesses in these initiatives 
underscore the fact that combating arms trafficking will require both legal and political 
approaches as well as practical disarmament measures in the field.33
  
 This chapter thus 
provides an overview of the efforts to combat the illicit trade in SALW. 
3.1 National Initiatives 
For several decades, states have been in charge of regulating their arms trade through laws 
governing the import, export, and transit of military goods. However, considering the current 
threats pose to national security and developmental initiatives, many national governments 
have recently embarked on specific efforts to reduce arms trafficking. In general, these 
efforts include reviewing existing or implementing new legislation to control the ownership 
and use of firearms by individuals; improving legislation on export controls; prioritizing 
tracing weapons seized from criminals; cracking down on suspect gun dealers; drafting 
legislation to control arms brokering; and destroying stocks of weapons surplus to national 
needs.34
 
  
                                                 
31 Dyer and O’Callaghan (1998) p.3 
32 Meek (2000) p.183 
33 UNGA Res. A/50/60, 25 January 1995 
34 Meek (2000) p.187 
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However, some states have not demonstrated any commitments to respond to the arms 
trafficking problem from and within their national jurisdiction. Some have argued that this 
lack in response may either be that a government is reluctant to address the issue due to 
ignorance or a lack of political will to take action; or the government is simply unable to 
respond and control the movement of goods across its borders.35
 
 Indeed, most of the 
countries that fall under the latter option are from the developing world and may genuinely 
lack the necessary capacity to undertake efficient and effective controls. Unlike drug 
trafficking, which is usually from the developing world to the developed world, arms 
trafficking are mostly from the developed to the less developed.  Increasingly, therefore, 
states begun to realized that regional approaches are necessary to address factors present in 
illicit arms trafficking that cannot be controlled nationally. 
3.2 Regional Initiatives 
Indeed, the trafficking in arms has become an enormous challenge for states not the least 
because it has proven to be complex and no respecter of border. The increasing inability of 
individual countries to stem the effects of the trade has prompted coordinated regional efforts 
in diverse areas of Africa, Europe, the Americas, Asia and the Middle East. These regional 
efforts are tailored toward combating arms trafficking in general as well as prioritizing the 
issue within the context of regional crime. 
 
3.2.1 The Americas 
It is posited that the illicit traffic in firearms first appeared on the radar of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) in 1990, in the context of its relationship to drug trafficking.36
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
 
Momentum around a Mexican-led initiative for a hemispheric-wide convention on illicit 
weapons trafficking resulted in the negotiation in 1997 of the Inter-American Convention 
36  Ibid, p. 189 
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against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives 
and Other Related Material.37 The convention came into force in 1998 with the aim “to 
prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, 
ammunition, explosives, and other related material” as well as “promote and facilitate 
cooperation among States Parties […]”38 The 30-article convention sets out a broad set of 
commitments, control mechanisms, legal requirements, and cooperation procedures.39 In 
addition, the Model Regulations,40 negotiated separately from the convention within the 
OAS, are an important part of efforts to tame the scourge of firearms trafficking in the 
Americas. However, despite the massive commitment to the principles of the convention by 
most countries in the region, their ability – financially and politically – to enact necessary 
measures to comply with the agreement remains less clear.41
 
  
3.2.2 Africa 
Following the 35th Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) held in Algiers in 
July 1999, the OAU convened the First Continental Meeting of African Experts on Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May 2000. The meeting decided on 
the adoption of an African common position and agreed a set of recommendations for the 
adoption of policies, institutional arrangements, operational measures for addressing the 
proliferation, circulation, and trafficking of small arms.42 The ensuing Bamako Declaration, 
issued in Mali during the OAU Ministerial Meeting held in December 2000, explicitly stated 
the wide-ranging and devastating impact that the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and 
light weapons is having on the African continent.43
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
 It therefore aims to ensure a coordinated 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid, p.191 
41 Ibid. 
42 Coe and Smith (2003) p.47 
43 Ibid. 
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action to control small arms proliferation across Africa at the national, regional, and 
international levels.  
 
It is also an important guide and reference point for the implementation of the other key 
African Agreements that have been concluded at the sub-regional level, including the 
Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, 
Ammunitions and Other Related Materials; the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light 
Weapons; and the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. Thus, whereas 
there may not exist a fully-fledged regional treaty or convention in Africa, these sub-regional 
initiatives represent a mix of legally and politically binding efforts within Africa to tackle the 
scourge of small arms and light weapons. Indeed, many of the commitments in the Bamako 
Declaration are similar to those contained in the sub-regional agreements even though, in 
some cases these sub-regional agreements have built upon and go beyond the commitments 
in the Bamako Declaration. Implementation of the Bamako Declaration has begun but at a 
slow pace.44
 
  
3.2.3 Europe 
The recognition of the problems associated with small arms and light weapons trafficking 
within the European Union (EU) started in the late 1990s. Barely a year after the EU adopted 
the “Program for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms” on 26 
June 1997,45 the 15 EU member states agreed the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports in 1998, 
which requires members to take into consideration issues such as human rights and regional 
stability when authorizing arms transfers.46
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 This program commits EU members to 
strengthen national efforts to prevent and combat arms trafficking, provide assistance to other 
45 Meek (2000) p.197 
46 Ibid 
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countries affected by arms trafficking and ensure cooperation among national authorities. In 
December 1998 the EU further adopted a Joint Action on Small Arms, which, among other 
things, commits EU members to providing financial assistance to countries combating illicit 
arms trafficking, as well as barring exports to non-state actors in other states without 
permission of the receiving government officials.47 The EU and the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have since adopted a number of other agreements and 
guidelines, including the 23 June 2003 European Union Common Council Position on Arms 
Brokering; and the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons of November 2000, 
all in the effort to stamp out the debilitating effects of the illicit trade in arms both within 
Europe and beyond.48
 
  
3.2.2.4 Other Regions 
As a sign of recognition of the global nature of the threats pose by the illicit trade in small 
arms and light weapons, Asia-Pacific and the Middle East and North Africa have become the 
latest regions taking collective efforts against arms trafficking within their respective regions. 
It is not to say that the effects of arms trafficking are new in those regions but that the 
response and the political will have been slow in coming. For instance, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) first raised the issue of small arms and light weapons at 
the 1997 Ministerial meeting held in Malaysia where the smuggling of small arms was 
recognized as integral part of terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking of 
persons, and piracy.49 This was followed by the adoption of the ASEAN Plan of Action to 
Combat Transnational Crimes in 1999.50 But it was not until the Jakarta Regional Seminar on 
Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons in May 2000, did the ASEAN 
addressed the small arms issue as a distinct topic.51
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have followed this seminar in the attempt at dealing with the arms trafficking problem in the 
region.52
 
  
Like the ASEAN case, the reaction within the Middle East and Northern Africa region was 
equally recent. The first regional workshop on small arms in the Arab World was held in 
Amman, Jordan on 6-7 May 2001.53 At the workshop, there was broad recognition that 
coordination and cooperation among Arab states were crucial components of effective action 
on small arms, chiefly among the areas of concern was the illicit trade in small arms.54 
Measures proposed by participants designed to tackle this problem included enhanced border 
controls, cooperation between law enforcement agencies, and common measures aimed at 
combating illicit arms brokering.55 Subsequently, the Ministerial Council of the League of 
Arab States adopted resolution 6447 of 14 September 2004 on Arab Coordination for 
Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.56
 
  
3.3 International Initiatives 
The destabilizing effects of illicit trade in SALW was first raised in 1995 by the then UN 
General Secretary, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his 1995 Supplement to ‘An Agenda for Peace’ 
in a UN forum in a General Assembly resolution.57 In the said resolution, he challenged the 
international community to ‘find effective solutions’ to the problem of small arms 
proliferation and misuse illustrated by the conflicts the UN was grappling with at that time. 
In December 1995, the General assembly authorized the first small arms Panel of Experts to 
prepare a report on the types of weapons being used and the nature and causes of their 
accumulation and transfer, and to make recommendations for appropriate action.58
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August 1997 report of the Panel recommended, inter alia, that the UN consider convening a 
global conference on the small arms issue.59 A second Group of Experts on small arms 
produced a report in August 1999 which set out objectives for an International Conference on 
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.60
 
  
The United Nations Conference, which was eventually held from 9-20 July 2001 at the UN 
Headquarters in New York, adopted a “Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate 
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, in All its Aspects.”61 This Program of 
Action includes a number of measures to be taken at the national, regional, and global levels, 
such as marking, registration, and destruction of weapons that were confiscated, seized, or 
collected, as well as international cooperation and assistance to strengthen the ability of states 
in identifying and tracing illicit arms and light weapons.62 Critics however found the 
Conference did not meet expectations: it did not produce a legally binding instrument nor did 
it make a case for such an instrument with sufficient vigor; and it fails to address some 
important points, namely, transfers to non-state actors, restrictions on civilian possession, and 
establishment of export criteria.63
 
 
To date, there are three specific international instruments concerning the small arms and light 
weapons issue. In May 2001, states agreed to common measures to combat illicit small arms 
- ‘Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime’, (the 2001 UN Firearms Protocol).64
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 This Firearms Protocol 
offers a regulatory framework to the challenges posed by proliferation of illicit firearms and 
ammunition, and it requires states, inter alia, to criminalize offences such as the illicit 
manufacture and trafficking of firearms and ammunition and the falsification or obliteration 
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of markings on firearms.65 The second international instrument is the July 2001 UN Program 
of Action to combat illicit small arms and light weapons.66 This instrument laid the 
foundation for action at the national, regional and global levels and has become a valuable 
tool for States, international organizations and civil society. As a direct recommendation 
from the Program of Action to combat illicit small arms and light weapons, states further 
adopted the ‘International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and 
Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons’ (International Tracing Instrument) 
in December 2005.67 This instrument also includes provisions on marking new production 
and Government stocks, marking at the time of import, as well as provides a framework for 
states to file, where relevant, small arms tracing requests with one another.68
 
 
Besides these three international instruments concerning the small arms issue, the Security 
Council has further used arms embargoes as a tool to address the illicit trade and brokering in 
small arms and light weapons as well as the destabilizing effect of their circulation. There are 
nine standard United Nations arms embargoes in force currently, which include prohibitions 
against, inter alia, the supply of small arms and light weapons to targeted states, entities and 
individuals.69 At the same time, Security Council arms embargoes have proven problematic 
as states and private actors have violated them with impunity. Although useful as a 
mechanism for limiting the influx of weapons into an area of conflict, arms embargoes are of 
limited use in preventing the build up of arms.70
 
 In short, the current control regimes are 
patchworks and do not work.  
In response to calls for greater global controls on the arms trade UN General Assembly 
passed a landmark resolution that established the UN process on an Arms Trade Treaty 
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(ATT) in December 2006.71 The proposed treaty would be legally binding for all states and 
cover all conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons, their parts and 
components and ammunitions. The UN Group of Governmental Experts, established under 
the December 2006 resolution, submitted its report to the UN Secretary General in August 
2008.72 In its report, the group took note of the existing international instruments on the arms 
trade as well as of trends in this trade, including the increasing production of arms and their 
components in joint ventures and licensed production arrangements. The group also observed 
that poor controls on the arms trade could contribute to violations of UN arms embargoes and 
the availability of illicit arms for use in terrorist acts and organized crime.73 In its discussion 
of the feasibility of an ATT, the group considered that any such treaty “would need clear 
definitions and be fair, objective, balanced, non-political, non-discriminatory and universal 
within the framework of the UN.”74
 
  
The UN General Assembly in October 2008 mandates further steps towards an ATT by an 
Open-Ended Working Group.75 The group, expected to submit an initial report to the General 
Assembly at its 64th session in 2009, is tasked to “further consider those elements in the 
report of the Group of Governmental Experts where consensus could be developed for their 
inclusion in an eventual legally binding treaty on the import, export and transfer of 
conventional arms.”76
 
 The working group does not, therefore, have a mandate to negotiate an 
international instrument on the arms trade. Thus, there is still no firm commitment at the 
UNGA to start negotiations of an ATT. The consensus-bound procedures of negotiations at 
the UN will allow individual states, should they so decide, to bloc further developments 
towards an ATT within the UN framework. There remain significant challenges, therefore, to 
realizing an arms trade treaty within the General Assembly framework. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. The Security Council and the Maintenance of Peace and Security 
The end of the Cold War has certainly seen an unprecedented epic of activism on the part of 
the UN Security Council. In both the interpretation of its authority and usage in its practices, 
it has exhibited and made profound decisions, sometimes on touchy subjects, in the effort to 
keep up with its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security. The 
increased activity of the SC, especially in relation to the tendency on its part to interpret 
extensively the idea of a “threat to the peace” in Article 39 of the UN Charter has triggered 
intense debate on the limits of its powers and the legitimacy of its practice. On the one hand, 
many countries and observers mostly from the Third World feel potentially threatening, the 
extent to which the Security Council has determined many situations as a threat to peace.77 
On the other hand, there are those countries and observers who support the usage of the 
Security Council’s almost limitless powers as an indication that ‘the Council had finally 
started working as had been originally planned.’78
 
 But which ever side of the debate one 
belongs to, it remains true that the resolutions adopted by the Security Council since the 90s 
invoking Chapter VII are unprecedented both in number and in the scope of their content.  
In this chapter, I will seek to analyze how the Security Council has understood and used its 
powers under the UN Charter, but more specifically under Chapter VII. I intend, through this 
analysis, to demonstrate how extensive the Council’s powers are in determining what 
constitute a threat to the peace. Particular attention will also focus on the Council’s 
‘legislative power’ to underscore the extent to which it may go in taking enforcement 
measures. The case studies will further be used to point to the wide range of issues that may 
pose a threat to the peace and the possible measures the Council may employ to give effect to 
its decisions.  
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4.1 The Interpretation of Treaties 
The interpretation of treaties remains one of the hotly debated issues in international law, 
often due to its complex nature and the many issues involved.79 The need for interpretation is 
evermore necessary since there is a great deal of difficulty on how treaty provisions or other 
legal texts, including the interpretation of the law of international organizations and their 
organs may be interpreted. One of the organs often dogged with much controversy over its 
powers and resolutions is the Security Council. In many ways, this may be due to the 
indeterminacy of language.80 Often in many legal documents, almost every term may be 
interpreted in various ways. Other times, a legal text may also be unclear, incomplete or 
contradictory because political differences between the negotiating parties necessitated a 
compromise formulation or simply because the ambiguity was overlooked by the drafters.81 
It is also argued that in addition to the inherent ambiguity of the language, some – often 
unforeseen - changes in the social, political or technological operating sphere of a treaty may 
add to the unclear, incomplete or contradictory nature of a legal text.82
 
 
However, one vital object in international public law is the interpretation of legal texts in a 
consistent manner so as to establish a less ambiguous or contradictory meaning.83
 
 There are 
different schools of thought on treaty interpretation but for the purpose of doing a systematic 
interpretation of the powers and the practices of the Security Council, I will briefly discuss 
the theoretical approaches, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and the 
United Nations Charter. I will end this section with the approach towards interpretation 
adopted in this study. 
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4.1.1 Theoretical Approaches to Interpretation 
The main theories relating to treaty interpretation are represented by the teleological, the 
subjective, and the textual schools. The former school places emphasis on the importance of 
the object and the purpose of a treaty.84 Thus, the most appropriate interpretation of a 
provision is one that best serves the object and purpose of the treaty. In the view of this 
doctrine, the general aim of the treaty prevails over the intentions held at the time of the 
conclusion of the treaty.85 This is understood in terms of the need for the effective 
functioning of an organization rather than the sovereignty of its members.86 Two main 
principles underline this view. The first is the principle of ‘maximum effectiveness’, 
expressed in the rule ut res magis valeat quam pereat, which imply that it is better for a thing 
to have effect than to be made void.87 In other words, the principle assumes every provision 
to be included for a reason, and that it should not be rendered redundant. The second 
principle is that a provision should be interpreted in accordance with the aim of the 
instrument as a whole.88 The teleological approach is commonly associated with multilateral 
conventions of a general nature, such as the UN Charter.89
 
 
The subjective school on the other hand, postulates that an interpreter must first and foremost 
try to ascertain the intentions of the parties to a treaty.90 A prominent proponent of this view, 
Lauterpacht, argues that ‘the intention of the parties – express or implied – is the law. Any 
considerations – of effectiveness or otherwise – which tend to transform the ascertainable 
intention of the parties into a factor of secondary importance are inimical to the true purpose 
of interpretation.’91
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establishing the correct meaning of a provision in a text is mainly enhanced when one takes 
into consideration what the parties intended to achieve in drafting the treaty, the historical 
background and the circumstances in which the treaty was signed. Some of the critiques of 
this doctrine are the questions of ‘where to find this evidence of these intentions’ and ‘what 
effects do unforeseen changes in social, political, economical or technological bring to the 
operating spheres of the treaty’? To the former, recourse to travaux préparatoires is a major 
aid in the interpretation process but on the latter, this doctrine offers little explanation.   
 
The final school of thought, the textual or literal meaning, presumes that the intention of the 
parties is adequately expressed in the text of a treaty.92 Accordingly, the fundamental means 
to determining the content of a provision is thus an analysis of its text, in conformity with the 
ordinary meaning of the words used. Some proponents have argued that ‘when a deed is 
worded in clear and precise terms, when its meaning is evident and leads to no absurdity, 
there is no ground for refusing to accept the meaning which the deed naturally presents.’93
 
 
Ironically, the mere possibility of the meaning of almost every text in a legal provision to be 
interpreted differently remains the main weakness of this doctrine.  
4.1.2 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
The Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties (VCLT) is a very important instrument 
defined as ‘a compound of codification and of progressive development of customary 
international law.’94 The convention’s customary international law status is further upheld by 
the International Court of Justice, which ruled on more than one occasion that the rules on 
interpretation contained in the Convention amounts to customary international law.95
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According to its Article 5, the VCLT applies to any treaty that constitutes the founding 
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charter of an international organization. However, even though the Convention applies 
strictly to only charters concluded subsequently to its entry into force in 1980,96 Articles 31 
to 33 of the Convention are to be applied by analogy to the interpretation of the Charter by 
the respective UN organs (especially the ICJ), by the specialized agencies, and by domestic 
courts and authorities.97
 
 These three articles may be applied retroactively to the Charter 
because the customary rules contained in them are deemed to be operative in 1945.  
In the first paragraph of Article 31 it is stated that, as a ‘general rule of interpretation’, a 
treaty “shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 
Interpretation according to the ‘principles of good faith’ is a bona fides rule which is not a 
specific rule of interpretation, but a general principle of law, the meaning of which is not 
undisputed and which substance called for a non-arbitrary interpretation of treaties and 
forbids  deviation from its ‘true’ substantive meaning.98 Interpretation ‘in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty’ on the other hand, can only be 
determined by looking at the context in which it is used.99
 
 In other words, a special meaning 
may only be given to a term if it is established that the parties intended to do so at the time of 
the founding. 
In addition to the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of 
its object and purpose, paragraphs 2 of Article 31 provide further recourse to be made in 
relation to other articles, the preamble to the treaty and its annexes, agreements between 
parties made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, and the instrument as a whole. 
Furthermore, paragraph 2 regards agreements made with regard to the interpretation of the 
treaty or application of its provisions and subsequent practice of the parties establishing 
agreement regarding the interpretation, as primary sources for determining the ‘correct’ 
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meaning of a term. Moreover, Article 32 of the Convention stipulates that recourse may be 
had to the “supplementary means of interpretation” in order to provide for additional 
evidence for an interpretation based on Article 31, or when such an interpretation leads to an 
ambiguous or unreasonable result. The Convention therefore provides for a mixture of all 
methods of interpretation. 
 
4.1.3 The United Nations Charter 
The United Nations is a unique organization different from all other international 
organizations due to the so-called objective international (legal) personality attributed to it by 
the ICJ, i.e. ‘a large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an 
international plane’.100 The UN Charter therefore has certain features distinguishing it from 
an ‘ordinary’ treaty. The Charter has, inter alia, been characterized as a constitution for the 
world community, containing elements of both a traite-contrat and a traite-lio.101
 
 The 
Charter is regarded as a constitution because it is the supreme law that establishes the UN, 
provides for the functions and powers of the organization as well as its organs. Due to its 
character as a constitution, rarely has the Charter been amended in almost its entire existence. 
With regards to the interpretation of the Charter, various schools of thoughts remain in 
contention. One school argues that considering that the circumstances surrounding the 
adoption of the Charter have changed significantly the Charter should be interpreted in a 
dynamic and teleological manner.102 The basis in arguing this way may be seen in the 
obvious change in the membership of the organization. Growth in statehood has seen a 
corresponding increase in the membership of the UN.103
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intention of the original members, which at this time form a minority.104 Consequently the 
principle of contemporaneity, according to which “a treaty is to be interpreted in the light of 
the general rules of international law in force at the time of its conclusion”,105
 
 has been 
significantly regarded as a principle accompanying the interpretation of the Charter. 
Contrary to the former school of thought is the proposition that upholds the intentions of the 
original parties as an integral part of the interpretation of the Charter: subsequent practice 
then refers to the application of the parties’ intentions and conversely the intentions can be 
deduced from this application.106
 
 This school raises high the role the travaux préparatoires 
may play in the Charter interpretation. However, using travaux préparatoires as a means of 
determining the intentions of the original parties to a multilateral treaty such as the UN 
Charter can be a difficult and ambiguous task.  
Aside these two competing schools of thought on how the UN Charter should be interpreted, 
it is to be noted that the notion of a “generally acceptable” interpretation has since been used 
in some cases by some of the organs of the UN, notably the Security Council.107 By this 
notion, an interpretative decision of an organ may be supported unanimously by its members, 
by a large majority or by a simple majority. However, a simple majority may not necessarily 
suffice and the ensuing practice would not be considered legally relevant with regard to the 
interpretation of the instrument upon which the organ based its actions.108 Hence, the degree 
of acceptability of an interpretation made by an organ of the UN depends on the amount of 
support received from the members of the organ concerned, and of the members of the UN 
not represented in the organ.109
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4.1.4 The Approach towards Interpretation Adopted in this Study 
The discussion above indicates how the UN Charter may be interpreted using almost all the 
different paradigms of interpretation on different occasions. One thing though is imperative: 
the need to interpret the Charter placing emphasis on the object and purpose of the 
organization. I have therefore chosen to adopt the teleological approach in this study. 
Another motivation for this choice is the need to adapt to the changes occurring within 
international relations and the fast globalizing world today. There are some obvious changes 
now from what pertained in the early days of the UN, therefore there is the urge to interpret 
the Charter dynamically to enable it maximize its effectiveness. I must, however, emphasize 
that considering the complexity involved in the interpretation of treaties as well as 
constituent instruments; I will also pay attention to distinctive features of the Charter which 
may require special attention in interpretation and explore them accordingly. In this regard, I 
will also make recourse to some of the applicable provisions of the Vienna Convention on 
the Laws of Treaties. In no way do I intend the choice of the teleological approach as the 
absolute means of interpreting the UN Charter.  
 
I should also mention some general consequences of this decision including the tendency to 
reduce the relevance of the preparatory work of the Charter as an interpretative aid, in favor 
of the subsequent practice of the organization. Again, since the UN is a highly politicized 
organization, interpretative decisions will usually be based on policy rather than legal 
considerations. Hence, there is a tendency among its organs not to mention the particular 
provisions upon which they have acted.110 Furthermore, in placing emphasis on the object 
and purpose of the organization, one need not take this too far as to ascribe extensive powers 
to international organizations upon ambiguous grounds of, for example, effectiveness, since 
this will inevitably lead to conflict with member-states and third parties.111
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illicit arms trade will be best served with regards to the object and purpose of the 
establishment of the Security Council. 
 
4.2. The Authority of the Security Council under the UN Charter 
The adoption of the UN Charter on the 25 June 1945 and its subsequent coming into force on 
24 October the same year may be herald, if not the most important, as one of the important 
days of the 20th Century. This period willed into reality the unprecedented collective 
resoluteness of the founding fathers of the UN to, as can be read in the preamble of the 
Charter, “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”.112 It is no gain-saying that, 
the maintenance of international peace and security was the ultimate purpose of the 
Organization.113
 
 The responsibility to ensure the fulfillment of this ultimate purpose is 
primarily entrusted into the hands of the UN Security Council. 
4.2.1 Functions and Powers of the Security Council 
The Security Council is one of six principal organs the United Nations established under 
Article 7 of the UN Charter. Its main functions and powers under the Charter are however 
contained in Articles 24 and 25. Paragraph 1 of Article 24 states that: 
 
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its 
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its 
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 
 
Conspicuously, paragraph 1 of Article 24 places the ‘primary responsibility’ for the 
‘maintenance of international peace and security’ on the SC. Even though proposals were 
tabled during the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) to 
provide for a larger role of the General Assembly, for several reasons these proposals were 
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not adopted.114 It has also been argued that ‘it is impossible to conceive of swift and effective 
action if the decision of the Council must be submitted to ratification by the GA or if the 
measures adopted by the Council are susceptible of revision by the Assembly’.115 This 
should not, however, be construed as excluding the GA from becoming active in the field of 
maintenance of peace and security under the general and specific powers conferred upon it. 
In fact, the GA has more than once demonstrated its concern in the maintenance of peace: the 
GA adopted the ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’116 and the on-going ‘Arms Trade Treaty’117 
process. There was general agreement on the paramount importance of the SC being placed 
in a position with the ‘primary responsibility’ to ‘ensure prompt and effective action by the 
United Nations’.118
 
 Having ‘primary responsibility’ also endows the SC priority both in time 
and in substance over the GA, i.e. in this case a main responsibility with regard to taking 
effective and binding action, especially enforcement measures.   
The first sentence of paragraph 2 also makes reference to the effect that in the discharge of its 
responsibility, the Council has to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
organization. This, in concert with the first paragraph of Article 1, which stipulates that the 
Council shall act in conformity with the “principles of justice and international law” in 
settling a dispute, is often construed as placing limits to the powers of the Council. But 
commentators have noted that this does not automatically warrant the conclusion that the 
Council is bound by the “principles of justice and international law” in exercising its 
functions.119
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will not only have curtailed the Council’s freedom of ‘swift’ action but would have been 
ultra vires.120 It, however, conforms to current understanding that the Council has to observe 
‘at least the limits of the law of the Charter’121
 
 in exercising its functions. 
Similarly problematic interpretation has also resulted from the provision of Article 24(1), 
according to which the SC, in discharging its functions for the maintenance of peace, acts on 
behalf of the member States. Some have interpreted this as meaning the SC in the discharge 
of its duties rests on a delegation of powers by the members.122 But this way of interpretation 
is incorrect since the SC derives its powers from the UN Charter itself.123 Even though 
decisions of the SC could affect those member States which are neither members of the SC 
nor agree to it, it remains an organ of the UN and accordingly acts on behalf of the 
Organization and not on behalf of individual member States.124
 
 Therefore, its actions and 
decisions are attributed to the UN Organization as a whole and not to individual members 
such as, for instance, the members of the Security Council.    
The second sentence in paragraph (2) further makes reference to the ‘specific powers granted 
to the Council for the discharge’ of these duties in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. This 
raises a debate on whether the powers of the SC are limited to those enumerated above. 
Many have, however, argued that the granting of ‘specific’ powers logically presupposes that 
the organ holding such ‘specific powers’ also has ‘general’ powers as well.125
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 Furthermore, 
listings of the powers in Article 24(2) is not to be taken as a final of powers conferred upon 
the SC because the Council has additional powers defined in other chapters of the Charter, 
notably Chapters IV, V and XIV. In addition, in its Advisory Opinion on Namibia, the ICJ 
held that the “reference in paragraph 2 of this Article 2(4) to specific powers of the Security 
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Council under certain chapters of the Charter does not exclude the existence of general 
powers to discharge the responsibilities conferred in paragraph 1.”126
 
  
In Article 25, the powers of the SC were further legitimized and bolstered: “The Members of 
the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with the present Charter.” It is to be acknowledged that what constitutes a 
‘decision’ and how ‘in accordance with the present Charter’ should be interpreted are 
ongoing debates. While the Charter does not settle the former, the latter is often explained 
out as having to do with decisions made in consonance with the object and purpose of the 
Charter as found in its Article 1. Decisions by the SC are generally regarded as binding on 
member states and this seems like an unambiguous provision. But sometimes they are 
problematic. For instance, whereas it is generally acknowledged that the powers of the 
Council relating to the pacific settlement of disputes (Chapter VI of the Charter) are 
recommendatory, and necessarily non-binding, measures taken by the Council under Chapter 
VII of the Charter certainly fall into the category of binding decisions.  
 
By and large, the binding nature of decisions made by the SC is upheld by the ICJ. The Court 
has held that “it is not possible to find in the Charter any support” for the contention that 
“Article 25 of the Charter applies only to enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VII 
of the Charter.”127 Hence the Court concluded that an interpretation that limits the domain of 
binding decisions to those decisions taken under Chapter VII would render Article 25 
“superfluous, since this [binding] effect is secured by Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter.”128
 
 
This study therefore upholds that decisions or measures taken by the Council are binding on 
member states if the Security Council so decides.  
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4.2.2 Chapter VII: ‘International Peace and Security’ 
Article 24(1) of the UN Charter bestows on the Security Council the primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security. But in the discharge of its duties 
paragraph 2 of the same article requires the Council to act in accordance with the purposes 
and principles of the UN laid out in Article 1. It is argued that these are the only express 
limits to the power of the Security Council under the Charter. These powers may not be 
absolute but they are extremely far-reaching that they give the Council, in some degree, the 
role of an ‘executive of the international community’.129
 
 In Chapter VII, thus, the Charter 
provides the Security Council it’s most extensive powers subject to very few express 
limitations in pursuance of its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security under the title “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, 
and Acts of Aggression.” To a certain degree, the Security Council’s far-reaching power in 
the international order is shrouded in its ability to enforce laws, adjudicate, legislate, and 
administrate.  
According to the system spelt out in this Chapter, the Council shall first decide whether a 
particular situation calls for action (Article 39). If such a situation has arisen, it may make 
recommendations (Article 39), take provisional measures (Article 40), or decide on 
enforcement measures not involving the use of force (Article 41), in order to remedy the 
situation. In the event these non-belligerent measures are ineffective, it may authorize 
measures involving the use of force, to put an end to a threat or breach of the peace or an act 
of aggression (Article 42). For instance, under Chapter VII enforcement measures are often 
taken explicitly in order to make states respect specific legal norms as with the enforcement 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the Iraq case.130
 
 The council is thus the law enforcement 
organ of the international community in the area of peace and security. 
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 Also, the Council’s quasi-judicial function is largely seen in the requirement under Chapter 
VII to determine the violation of a norm in order to enforce the law. For instance, it 
determined that the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq or declarations and actions under duress in 
the Bosnian War, were ‘null and void’ and that Iraq was liable for damages in result of the 
invasion of Kuwait.131 It is further argued that by taking binding measures under Chapter 
VII, the Council is authorized to create new law and thus to act, to a certain degree, as a 
legislator. In likewise manner, the Council has authorized the administration of territory as an 
enforcement measure under Chapter VII as in the cases of Kosovo and East Timor.132
 
 Since 
this study borders on the possibility for the Security Council to legislate on behalf of the UN 
Members in order to regulate the global arms trade, the legislative power of the Council is 
further discussed below. 
4.2.2.1 The ‘Legislative Power’ of the UN Security Council 
Just as the Security Council is endowed with the clout to enforce international law and 
adjudicate conflicts resulting from the application of international law, it is equally 
empowered to make decisions (make laws) under Chapter VII that will bind UN member 
states. Contrary to the opinion that ‘Hard’ or binding international law could be created only 
by states, whether through the adoption and ratification of treaties, the creation of customary 
law by means of general practices supported by opinio juris, or the creation of general 
principles of law, the Council has started legislating in recent times.133
 
 It must be recognized 
that under Articles 25 and 48(1) of the UN Charter, the Security Council can adopt decisions 
that are binding on UN members. Although non-members are not directly bound by the 
Charter, its Article 2(6) requires the Organization to ‘ensure that’ such states acts in 
accordance with the principles set out in Article 2 “so far as may be necessary for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.”  
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However, these decisions must be taken in exercise of the Council’s “primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security” under Article 24(1), and their 
potential binding nature is clearest when taken under Chapter VII upon a determination by 
the Council that there exists “a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or acts of 
aggression.”134 In this regard the Council has frequently, especially since the end of the Cold 
War, imposed economic sanctions or other restrictions requiring compliance by all states. By 
their nature these restrictions are imposed for a limited purpose – to secure compliance by a 
target state – and explicitly or implicitly are limited in time until that purpose is 
accomplished. These decisions of the Council cannot, therefore, be considered as establishing 
new rules of international law.135
 
 However, beginning from 28 September 2001, the Council, 
reacting to the events of September 11, departed from its previous limited and cautious 
practice. 
The Security Council, for instance, adopted Resolution 1373 (2001) to counter the threat of 
terrorism, by which it decided in two operative paragraphs, “that all States shall” take certain 
actions against the financing of terrorist activities, as well as miscellany of other actions 
designed to prevent support for any terrorists and terrorist activities.136 In addition, the 
resolution established a plenary committee of the Council (since referred to as the “Counter-
Terrorism Committee”) to monitor implementation of the resolution and called on all states 
to report on their compliance with it, initially within ninety days and thereafter according to a 
timetable to be proposed by the committee.137 Resolution 1540 (2004) on Non-Proliferation 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction is the latest ‘legislative’ resolution from the Security 
Council.138
                                                 
134 UN Charter Article 39 
 The resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, is legally binding 
on all UN member states, and obliges them to take a range of steps aimed at preventing the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their delivery systems and related 
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material, especially by non-state actors.139
 
 The resolution also creates a committee of the 
Council to monitor its implementation. 
In a briefing on the Council’s schedule for April 2004, its President, referring to the plan 
adoption of Resolution 1540, described the ongoing consultation for that resolution as “the 
first step towards having the Security Council legislates for rest of the United Nations’ 
membership.” He explained that “[Resolution] 1373 had been the first step” and that the 
“Council would be needed more and more to do that kind of legislative work.”140 
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1995 held in the Tadić case: “There is […] no legislature, in the 
technical sense of the term, in the United Nations system. That is to say, there exists no 
corporate organ formally empowered to enact laws directly binding on international legal 
subjects.”141
However, any categorical assertion that seeks to suggest that the Council enjoys unfettered 
discretion may not go unchallenged, as has been indicated by the ICJ that the latter’s 
decisions may be subject to judicial review.
 In this case, it may be argued that while the powers of the Security Council may 
be subject to, if any, few express limitations, the Council certainly enjoys extensive clout in 
its appreciation of what constitutes a threat to the peace, and thus justifies the exercise of its 
special lawmaking powers.  
142 For instance, in the Lockerbie case, the ICJ 
ruled it admissible even though it was already seized upon by the SC.143 It should be noted 
that while the SC may enjoy priority on issues regarding international peace and security 
over the GA, such competence of the SC vis-à-vis the ICJ, however, can not find support in 
any other Charter provisions or any general principles of law.144
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pendens or res judicata may be raised against the ICJ acting simultaneously (or prior to or 
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after the SC) in a case pending before the SC.145 The procedures of the SC and the ICJ have 
to be recognized as being independent of one another and would have to take each other’s 
decisions into consideration.146 However, recourse to Article 103 of the UN Charter reveals 
that, in the event of conflict between a request and the Rome Statue, the request will prevail. 
In the Lockerbie case, for instance, the ICJ held that obligations imposed by the Council take 
precedence over obligations under international treaties.147
 
 Evidence of this fact may be 
drawn from the basis that the case has since become moot in the Court since the Council took 
further action against Libya. 
It is also vital that one does not remain oblivion of some of the general objections that may 
be raised to Security Council legislation. First, a patently unrepresentative and undemocratic 
body such as the Council is arguably unsuitable for international lawmaking.148 However, 
valid as this objection may be, it could also be made to any other Council action. Yet it can 
hardly be maintained that authorizing the use of force requires less democratic legitimacy 
than imposing a general obligation to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts.149 
Second, Council practice may be criticized as contrary to the basic structure of international 
law as a consent-based legal order. But any such view may be deemed to overlook the nature 
of all binding decisions of the Council as, according to Article 25 of the UN Charter, based 
on the consent of the member states.150 Finally, the assumption of legislative powers by the 
Council may be said to be hard to reconcile with its general role under the Charter as a 
“policemen” rather than a legislature or jury. However, it must be noted that the powers of 
the Council are to be determined not by reference to its general role but on the basis of the 
provisions of the UN Charter.151
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4.2.2.2 Articles 39, 40, and 41 
According to Article 39, it is incumbent on the Council to determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression: 
 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
 
However, how international peace – and subsequent threats to and breaches of it – is to be 
defined remains a problematic task. The Charter itself is silent on the term, and the travaux 
préparatoires indicate that this was done deliberately.152 It is worth remembering that after a 
long debate surrounding what constitute a ‘threat to or breaches’ of the peace during the 
UNCIO, it was decided “to leave to the Council the entire decision, and also the entire 
responsibility for that decision, as to what constitutes a threat to the peace, a breach of the 
peace, or an act of aggression.”153 Endowed with such discretionary powers, Malanczuk puts 
it that: “a threat to the peace seems to be whatever the Security Council says is a threat to the 
peace”.154
 
 While it may be plausible to acknowledge the skepticism surrounding the 
extensive interpretation of a ‘threat to the peace’, it may be also argued that it allows the 
Council to adapt Article 39 to the changing times and changing problems of international 
concern.  
Some authors have long argued that at the time of the drafting of the UN Charter what were 
considered to constitute “threats to the peace” were arguably military threats to international 
peace.155
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 Today, however, it has become almost a tautology to point out that not only 
military but also social, political, economic, humanitarian, ecological and other non-military 
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factors may constitute threats to the peace, domestic or international.156 At the first meeting 
of the Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government in January 1992, it 
was acknowledged that “The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not 
in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the 
economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to international 
peace and security.”157
 
 By and large, the express incorporation of the threat to the peace 
makes Article 39 applicable even before armed conflicts break out. Subsequently, and as will 
be discussed in the next section of this chapter, the practice of the Council certainly indicates 
how it has extensively interpreted what constitutes a threat to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
In addition, the notion of an ‘international’ or ‘domestic’ threat to the peace merits discussion 
here. “Threat to the peace” as mentioned in Article 24(1) often regarded as relating solely to 
interstate relations, from the formal point of view and also international law in general, has 
also undergone radical changes since the UN Charter was drafted. The Council’s practices 
depict that it takes into consideration as a “threat to the peace” also a situation which 
emanates from within one country only and which does not really threaten anything more 
than the domestic peace of one country.158
 
 Perhaps the pulling factor for this practice on the 
part of the Security Council is the fact that sooner or later some of these conflicts escalate 
beyond internal borders and become threats to neighboring countries. For instance, in Africa, 
primarily but not exclusively, the fact that the domestic conflicts are often ethnically based, 
together with the fact that the same people often live on either side of official boundaries 
separating states, easily contribute to making domestic conflicts indirectly international.  
Article 40 also gives the Security Council the clout to take what it refers to as ‘provisional 
measures’ prior to the measures contemplated in Articles 41 and 42: 
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In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, 
before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for 
in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional 
measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be 
without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The 
Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such 
provisional measures. 
 
It appears obvious to say that the purpose of these provisional measures is to prevent an 
aggravation of the situation. Doubts, however, hang on whether these provisions require a 
prior determination of the Council pursuant to Article 39 as well as the binding character of 
these measures. It has been argued elsewhere that once Article 40 is under Chapter VII and 
not Chapter VI, the view that these provisional measures can only be adopted if the 
requirements of Article 39 are met, in other words if there exists at least a threat to the peace, 
is the most plausible. Besides, it would be reasonable to argue that all actions under Chapter 
VII shall be subject to that requirement. Therefore, depending on the intentions of the 
Council, it may both make recommendations and take binding decisions under Article 40.159
 
 
In dealing with non-belligerent situations, the Security Council is empowered by Article 41 
to decide what measures are necessary to give effect to its decisions: 
 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations. 
 
This Article, often regarded as the cornerstone of the new system of collective security of the 
UN, allows the Council to take concrete steps, sometimes in the form of ‘targeted’, ‘smart’ 
sanctions, which affect those responsible for the breach of the peace without adversely 
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affecting bystanders.160  Thus, this article provides the legal basis of making decisions on all 
non-military issues as well as taking of measures to ensure their implementation. These 
measures - which may include but not limited to those identified in the Article 41 - are not 
dependent on a prior application of provisional measures under Article 40.161 The implication 
is that if the requirements in Article 39 are met, the Council can make a decision and 
determine which measures to employ in other to implement its decision to maintain or restore 
the peace. In the past, the Security Council has invoked this power in different ways 
including; economic and diplomatic restrictions, the creation and determination of legal 
obligations of the targeted state, the creation of the international criminal tribunals, and 
international administration of territories.162
 
  
4.3 Application of the UN Security Council’s Power: Three Cases 
The foregoing overview of the powers and functions of the Security Council as ascribed to it 
by the UN Charter; particularly Chapter VII, underscores the seemingly limitless powers the 
Council wields. This section will analyze three cases to highlight the various ways the 
Council has function with regards to what constitutes a ‘threat to the peace’ and what 
measures were employed to restore or remove such threats. These cases are intended to 
underscore the extensive ways in which the Council has and can determine a situation, not 
necessarily military in character, as a threat to the peace. This will provide the framework for 
the subsequent interpretation of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) as a 
threat to the peace and therefore subsume it under the focus of the Security Council. 
 
4.3.1 Libya and the Lockerbie Incident 1988-2000 
The infamous Lockerbie incident happened on 21 December 1988 during which Pan Am 
Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 passengers and 11 local 
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residents.163
 
 Three years later, the Security Council, through resolution 731 (1992), after the 
UK, the US, and France presented their cases to the Council, urged the Libyan government to 
extradite its nationals allegedly responsible for placing a bomb on the flight. The Libyan 
government instead presented the case to the International Court of Justice based on the 1971 
Montreal Convention, after it denied the Council’s request. The ICJ upon further 
consideration of the issue ruled that the case was admissible. During the proceedings, Libya 
asked the Court to indicate interim measures of protection so as to ensure that the US and the 
UK would not take any action against Libya with regard to the extradition of its nationals. 
Even before the Court could make a decision on the request by Libya, the Security Council 
determined by resolution 748 (1992) that the non-extradition of the Libyan nationals 
constituted a threat to international peace and security:  
In this context that the failure by Libyan Government to demonstrate by concrete 
actions its renunciation of terrorism and in particular, its continued failure to 
respond fully and effectively to the requests in Resolution 731 (1992), constitute 
a threat to international peace and security.164
 
 
The Council, in the same resolution demanded that Libya extradite the suspects, with the 
imposition of sanctions as the repercussion for failure to do so. With Libya remaining defiant 
in the face of the Council’s demands, the sanctions – calling on all states to adopt coercive 
measures (including an aerial, arms embargo and diplomatic sanctions) against Libya - 
became operative in April 1992. In November 1993 the Council reviewed the situation and 
determined in the preamble of resolutions 883 (1993) that Libya’s non-compliance with 
resolution 731 (1992) and 748 (1992) constituted a “threat to international peace and 
security.”165 The Council further tightened the sanctions to include urging all states to freeze 
Libyan funds and resources abroad in addition to other economic sanctions.166
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were only suspended after years of negotiations which resulted in a compromise between 
Libya, the US and the UK to try the suspects in the Netherlands.167
 
 
In analyzing this case, two questions need answering: what brings this case under the 
jurisdiction of the SC; and by what procedure it took action. On the former question, it may 
be argued that it is a case involving international terrorism, one that poses a threat to the 
peace. On the latter, it must be noted that the council first adopted resolution 731 (1992) 
under Chapter VI of the UN Charter in which it ‘strongly urged’ Libya to comply with the 
extradition requests made by the US and the UK. Haven failed to comply with the non-
binding appeal, and rather going to the ICJ, the Council adopted resolution 748 (1992), in 
which it invoked Article 39 by determining that the non-compliance by Libya with the 
requests contained in resolution 731 (1992) constituted a threat to international peace and 
security. In the same resolution, Libya was requested to act within a stipulated time frame or 
face sanctions under Article 41.  
 
As Libya defiantly refused to comply, the sanctions became operative in April 1992. 
Resolution 883 (1993) was further used by the Council to reiterate its earlier Article 39 
determination that the non-extradition of its nationals by Libya constituted a threat to 
international peace and security and imposed additional sanctions under Article 41. Parallel 
to the Libyan case, the SC determined that Sudan’s harboring of alleged terrorists who 
attempted to assassinate the president of Egypt Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995, is a 
threat to the peace.168
 
 As Sudan remained defiant in the face of the Council’s requests, the 
Council imposed sanctions on Sudan including arms embargo. 
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4.3.2 Rwanda 1993-1996 
The 1990 ethnically motivated civil war in Rwanda between the Hutu-dominated government 
forces and the Tutsi Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) resulted in the loss of an estimated 
500,000 - 1,000,000 lives.169 After initially confining itself to expressions of concern 
regarding the situation in Rwanda, the Security Council made a formal determination that 
“the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and 
security in the region” in resolution 918 (1994).170 In the same resolution the Council also 
claimed to be “deeply concerned by the continuation of the systematic and widespread 
killings of the civilian population in Rwanda”.171 The Council imposed an arms embargo on 
Rwanda in the same resolution. It must be noted that prior to this, the Council had already 
sent two peacekeeping missions to Rwanda: the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-
Rwanda (UNOMUR); and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
(UNAMIR).172 In the wake of the unsuccessful operations of the aforementioned forces, the 
Council authorized a multilateral force to intervene in Rwanda, unfortunately, only after the 
worst atrocities had already occurred. Indeed, the failure of the United Nations as whole but 
the Security Council in particular to prevent the genocide in Rwanda has been recognized by 
the Organization itself.173
 
 The Security Council not perturb by all the previous shortcomings 
decided to establish an international Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by resolution 955 
(1994), shortly after some semblance of stability returned to Rwanda as a result of the victory 
of the RPF. 
This case points to other pertinent issues that often invoke the use of powers of the Security 
Council: humanitarian law, genocide and crimes against humanity. Under Article 39, the 
Council determined in resolution 918 (1994) that the situation in Rwanda constitutes ‘a threat 
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to the peace and security in the region’. The Council further established arms embargo as 
well as the ICTR as a measure under Article 41; and then authorized intervention in Rwanda 
as a measure taken under Article 42. In a similar fashion, the Security Council earlier on 
established the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to address the 
issue of violations of humanitarian law by the parties to the Yugoslav conflict.174
 
  
4.3.3 The HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The determination of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa as a threat to 
international peace and security is just another attestation to the extensive powers of the 
Security Council to determine a situation as a ‘threat to the peace’. This determination, just 
like many others, was not without any initial disagreement. After the initial reluctance of the 
UK, France, China and Russia, during the 4087th meeting of the Security Council in which 
the US made a case for the consideration of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa 
as a security threat, they came to agree as much a year later.175
 
 The formal case was made by 
the former US Vice President Al-Gore when he presided over the Council’s meeting on 10 
January 2000. He outlined a three point syllogistic argument for the proposition as follows; 
1. “The heart of the security agenda is protecting lives” 
2. “When a single disease threatens everything from economic strength to 
peacekeeping, we clearly face a security threat of the greatest magnitude” 
3. “It is a security crisis because it threatens not just individual citizens, but the very 
institutions that define and defend the character of a society”.176
 
 
When an agreement was eventually reached among the Council Members, resolution 1308 
(2000) acknowledged the HIV/AIDS security nexus: “Recognizing the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
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is also exacerbated by conditions of violence and instability” and the converse: “stressing 
that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security.”177
 
 
In addition, the resolution expressly included the encouragement of member states to 
increase international cooperation among their relevant national bodies to assist with the 
creation and execution of policies for HIV/AIDS prevention. In addition, it has urged further 
discussion among relevant United Nations bodies, Member States, industry and other 
relevant organizations to make progress, inter alia, on the question of access to treatment and 
care, and on prevention. Some have argued that the securitization of AIDS in international 
fora has been motivated by the human security concept interpreted principally as an 
extension of the responsibility to protect human rights.178 The determination of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic as a ‘threat to the peace’ by the Council, proved to be a very difficult 
and touchy subject. For instance, when Richard Holbrooke, the Clinton administration’s 
ambassador to the UN, was reported to have made a phone call to Kofi Annan, the then UN 
Secretary General, telling him “we had to have a Security Council meeting on AIDS”, Kofi 
Annan was equally reported to have first retorted “we can’t do that. AIDS isn’t a security 
issue.”179
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
177 UNSC Res. S/1308/2000, 17 July 2000 
178 Gwyn (2006) p.227 
179 Ibid, pp.224-225 
 51 
CHAPTER FIVE 
5. Discussion and Analysis of Research Questions 
The object of this chapter is to undertake a thorough discussion and analysis, first, in 
determination of the extent to which the current ‘global arms trade’ may qualify as a ‘threat 
to the peace’ under Article 39 of the UN Charter and subsequent practice of the UN Security 
Council; and second, what enforcement measure(s) may be available to and within the power 
of the Security Council should the arms trade be deemed a threat to the peace. 
 
5.1 The Global Arms Trade as a Threat to the Peace  
Direct military threats on the part of one state against another state have long been held as 
constituting the traditional notion of threats to international peace and security. However, 
since the end of the Cold War the Security Council has generally widened its interpretation 
of the notion of threat to the peace in Article 39 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. For 
instance, the Council’s practice with respect of the interpretation of Article 39 implied that, 
inter alia, civil wars, serious human rights violations, lack of democracy, terrorism and 
serious violations of international humanitarian law do constitute real threats to international 
peace and security and give rise to a “threat to the peace” under Article 39. Thus, the practice 
of the Council has further expanded the notion of threat to the peace beyond specific concrete 
situations to more generally abstract situations.  
 
It must be acknowledged that there are cases where the Security Council has not intervened. 
But, a close look at both cases where the Security Council acts, in particular, in the cases 
considered in this study and in cases where it does not, as with the arms trade, the real 
question would be whether there was a threat to the peace. In both cases, however, it is not 
impossible to determine whether or not, in the short run or in the long run, the situations do 
really constitute threats to international peace and security. It is often argued that where the 
Council did not consider a situation as serious was almost certainly based on completely 
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different premises, inter alia, the existence of the veto and lack of resources but not that there 
really is no threat to the peace either in the short run or long run.180 But the recent practice of 
the Council with respect to whether there really exists a threat to the peace suggests not only 
which kinds of situations may lead to international armed conflict. The presumption here is 
that “threat to the peace” in Article 39 means a threat to international peace.181
 
  
In relation to this presumption, two features have come to characterize the situations that 
have been determined by the Council as constituting a threat to the peace. The first feature is 
in what way “peace” itself is defined; whether it is defined narrowly, as the absence of war, 
or broadly, as not only the absence of war but also as the presence of certain positive social, 
economic, humanitarian and ecological circumstances.182 A look at the three cases discussed 
in this study shows the Council’s practices embrace the latter definition. In the said cases, 
civil war, states’ reluctance to act in the face of terrorism and a health situation have all been 
deemed as a threat to international peace. In many other cases not discussed in this study, 
similar abstract situations have also been regarded as such.183 The other feature has to do 
with the severity of the danger a situation poses to the peace. An examination of the cases 
discussed reveals that chances are quite high that once the Security Council does decide to 
determine the existence of a threat to the peace it is a serious enough situation to deserve the 
epithet “threat to the peace”.184
  
 For instance, genocide, terrorism and HIV/AIDS have all 
been regarded serious enough situations to be a threat to the peace in the cases discussed. 
The global arms trade, just like many of the situations discussed above may not be 
categorized under a typical ‘traditional’ notion of what constitutes a threat to the peace. 
However, in many diverse ways it constitutes a threat to international peace and security. In 
the first instance, the UN has admittedly conceived illicit arms trafficking as an issue of law 
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183 Österdahl (1998) pp. 43-79 
184 Ibid, p.88 
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enforcement and crime control.185
 
 It has been linked to drug trafficking, terrorism, money 
laundering, international organized crimes and other clandestine activities. Similarly, almost 
all the regional initiatives equally acknowledge the intrinsic role arms trafficking has in the 
above mentioned crimes. Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), in paragraph 4, for 
instance, notes with concern, the close connection between international terrorism and trans-
national organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal 
movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials.  
In the second instance, it is linked to the integrated approach,186
 
 which regards illicit 
trafficking in arms as a phenomenon that undermines peace, structural stability and long-term 
development. The destabilizing effect of trafficking in SALW is no more in doubt. In Africa 
where its adverse effect is nothing but vicious, SALW remain the main weapons of choice 
used in almost all the wars fought since the 1990s and the conflicts still on-going. In the 
Americas, they are weapons of choice for drug cartels and a great source of insecurity. The 
SALW have been labeled as the real ‘weapons of mass destruction’ of our time with the 
illicit arms trade labeled as an ‘on-going slaughter’ that needs to be stopped immediately. It 
is my submission therefore that whiles the arms trade, and for that matter arms trafficking, 
may not belong to the narrow definition of peace, it definitely belongs to the broad definition 
and is conspicuously serious enough to be determined as a threat to the peace.  
Furthermore, as already indicated in chapter three, a number of initiatives have since the late 
1990s been pursued not the least by various United Nations organs and specialized agencies 
in the attempt to combat the dangers arms trafficking pose to world stability and peace. A 
number of panel of expert groups on SALW have over the last two decades been founded to 
provide expert advice on the issue. A UN sponsored conference and a number of seminars 
have also undertaken extensive deliberations on the issue. Three international instruments 
and a series of resolutions, mostly non-binding, are currently in place seeking to deal with 
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various aspects of the arms trade. The adoption of the UNGA resolution to start the process 
on an Arms Trade Treaty in December 2006 is the only initiative seeking to comprehensively 
address the problem. Similar actions have also been pursued in regional and sub-regional 
levels.  
 
5.2 The Security Council to Legislate to Regulate the Arms Trade 
As a direct consequence of the widening of its repertoire of what constitutes a threat to the 
international peace, the Security Council has also expanded the arsenal in its tools kit with 
respect to the breadth of enforcement measures available for giving effect to its decisions 
under Chapter VII. At the same time, it can be noted that in some of the cases where the 
Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace it has not taken any 
enforcement measures at all to eliminate the threat.187
 
 This was the case with respect to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. In most cases, however, the Council has 
followed up its determinations with decisions on enforcement measures, especially non-
military, of varying degrees of severity. In the case of Rwanda for instance the Council 
begun by instituting an arms embargo, authorized a multilateral intervention and later 
established an international criminal court for Rwanda. In some cases, and after some display 
of disrespect for the decision of the Council on the part of the authorities in the country 
concerned, as in the case of Libya in the Lockerbie case, a set of comprehensive economic 
and diplomatic sanctions are imposed. 
Up until its first legislative resolution of 1373 in 2001, the Security Council’s arsenal of 
enforcement measures involving non-military measures have largely been of law 
enforcement and judicial character. But resolutions 1373 and 1540, herald the dawn of an era 
of legislative activity of the Council. These two resolutions give rise to two interrelated 
questions as far as this study is concerned. First, is the Security Council endowed with the 
power to undertake lawmaking as an enforcement measure under Article 41 and, second, can 
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obligations of a general and abstract character such as to criminalize a certain behavior and to 
enact certain laws be subsumed under the term “measures” in the sense of Article 41of the 
Charter?  
 
In the former question, though disagreements exist among international lawyers on the 
legislative powers of the Council, the Council conceives such powers on the basis of its 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security as spelt out under Article 24 
of the UN Charter. In Chapter VII, the Council can take binding decisions not involving the 
use of force under Articles 39 and 41 and may call upon all states to take certain measures. 
And these decisions by the Council may border on law enforcement, adjudication, 
administration or lawmaking. Perhaps the real question should concern rather whether or not 
the rest of the UN member states outside the fifteen composing member states of the Security 
Council will willingly accept and implement such legislation from the Council? By the 
provisions in Article 25 of the UN Charter, one may argue that member states, by giving the 
Council the responsibility to maintain international peace and security in Article 24, have 
also agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council in accordance with the 
present Charter. In the case of resolution 1373, its adoption was widely welcomed by the UN 
member states and with no speaker expressing concern that the Council was legislating for 
the international community.188
 
  
On the latter question, one may argue that once general phenomena as threats to the peace 
find acceptance under Article 39, the Security Council may equally choose to impose 
obligations of a general and abstract character on member states under Article 41. The fact 
that the obligations imposed in resolutions 1373 and 1540 are more akin to obligations 
entered into by states in international agreements should not be a problem as long as they are 
comprehensive and within the limits of the Council. In any case, the term “measures” is wide 
enough to include both specific and general obligations. Besides, the list of measures in 
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Article 41 is not exhaustive, as the formulation “may include” shows. This interpretation has 
been confirmed in the Tadić case where the appeals chamber of the ICTY held that “It is 
evident that the measures set out in Article 41 are merely illustrative examples which 
obviously do not exclude other measures. All the article requires is that they do not involve 
“the use of force.”189
 
  
The relative success of resolutions 1373 and 1540, in terms of their acceptance by the 
remaining UN member states, is an indication to the fact that if used properly, this process of 
lawmaking by the Security Council can provide the Council a useful means of responding 
swiftly to abstract threats, as in the case of the global arms trade, to international peace and 
security. The severity of the danger pose by the arms trade is comparable and connected to 
those pose by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In addition, it has been argued that 
the substantive rules imposed on all states in resolutions 1373 and 1540 were not suddenly 
invented by the Council but were based, albeit somewhat loosely, on prior resolutions of the 
General Assembly adopted unanimously or by overwhelming majorities.190
 
 Even though the 
Security Council is not obligated to adopt this approach, in the case of the arms trade, it 
would have a number of relevant resolutions and international instruments to work with 
should it choose to do so. Furthermore, considering the overwhelming support for the ATT 
idea, any attempt by the Security Council to put in place a similar mechanism to combat the 
illicit arms trade would not be met with any insurmountable opposition. A more broadly and 
participatory consultative process through the Security Council would be swifter and best 
suited than the ATT process.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Summary and Conclusion 
6.1 Summary 
The discussion on the global arms trade and its human cost in chapter two points to how 
complex but even more dangerous the arms trade has become since the 90s. In contrast to 
weapons systems that can be prohibited outright, small arms and light weapons have a range 
of legitimate uses involving both public and private actors (police, military, and civilians). 
Therefore, there is the need for a legitimate trade in and transfer of SALW. However, it is 
also a fact that small arms and light weapons proliferation is no more merely a security issue. 
The carnage, terror, and the erosion of socio-economic development being made possibly 
through the illicit transfers of SALW call for urgent global controls to arrest the situation. 
The illicit arms trade is a tragedy that takes place every day with no immunity for neither 
anybody nor any country.  
 
In chapter three we see an overview of the efforts to combat the illicit trade in arms thus far. 
Parallel efforts continue to occur within countries and regions, while being complemented by 
international momentum, although less perfectly than desired. Thus state regulatory systems 
have proven insufficient and ineffective. Regional initiatives abound now with moderate 
successes in tackling the global problem in the various regions. Some progress has also been 
made in the last decade within the UN framework with three international instruments to deal 
with the problem in addition to the largely flouted UN Security Council arms embargoes. 
The ATT process remained the only hope for the enactment of a holistic internationally 
binding instrument to regulate the arms trade. Yet, hope in the UNGA initiated ATT process 
is fast diminishing as the consensus bound process, almost three years on, is still faced with 
lack of commitment to start negotiating for an ATT. Therefore, some intervention to keep 
this ATT idea from falling apart would be urgently required from the Security Council. After 
all, the Council has the primary responsibility under the UN Charter to take enforcement 
measures against all threats, including those pose by the illicit trade in SALW, to the peace.  
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Chapter four has also been very insightful for a number of reasons. First, it underscores the 
fact that while there may be different ways to interpret the powers and practices of the 
Security Council, doing so within the framework of the object and purpose of the Charter 
establishing the Council will enable it to be dynamic in dealing with present and future 
threats. Second, the chapter highlights the fact that in pursuance of its primary responsibility 
to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council is given its most extensive 
powers under Chapter VII subject to very few express limitations. The Council has the clout 
to determine a situation as a threat to or breach of the peace or as an act of aggression under 
Article 39. It may employ interim measures under Article 40 or take enforcement measures, 
including legislation making, on non-belligerent issues under Article 41 to give effect to its 
decisions. Finally, in practice, as the case studies indicate, the Council has demonstrated the 
endless nature of issues that may pose a threat to the maintenance of international peace and 
security, including both abstract and specific threats to the peace. Thus, ‘threat to the peace’ 
is a constantly evolving concept. The cases also highlights the far-reaching range of possible 
enforcement measures the Council is capable of employing to give effect to its decisions.  
 
6.2 Conclusion 
Indeed, trafficking in arms is a consequence of the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons and of the absence of adequate legislation in the areas of SALW controls, 
import/export and border control. Both explicit and implicit acknowledgement of the severity 
of the dangers the current global trade in arms poses to national, regional and international 
peace and security evidently abound in the series of initiatives, although inadequate, being 
pursued from the individual national arena through to the global arena. It is no gain-saying 
that one of today’s most immediate threats to international peace and security in the 21st 
Century remains proliferation of small arms and light weapons, made possible through the 
illicit arms trade. It is therefore incumbent on the Security Council to prioritize and 
acknowledge the arms trade as a threat to the peace. 
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Subsequent to any such acknowledgement by the Council would be the imperatives for the 
Council to take immediate but comprehensive steps to deal with the threats. In resolutions 
1373 and 1540, the Security Council has set a robust precedence. The Security Council is 
once again called to duty as the custodian of international peace and security. Legislating 
again, this time, to counter the adverse effect the global arms trade is having on international 
peace and security would be a matter of necessity. For inaction on the part of the Council, 
with respect to the destabilizing effects of the current global arms trade, would not only 
deprive the world any semblance of peace and security but it would also render the 
fulfillment of the Security Council’s present day primary role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security questionable. 
 
It is my submission that the current unregulated global arms trade is a threat to international 
peace and security. That the severity of the threats pose by the arms trade is evident in its 
adverse effects on socio-economic developmental efforts; and how it fuels other related 
threats as in drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, intra-state conflicts and the 
violation of both humanitarian and human rights laws.  The Security Council should 
therefore determine the current global arms trade as a threat to the peace. It is also my 
submission that the Security Council should follow up its determination of the arms trade as 
a threat to the peace with another legislative act akin to resolutions 1373 and 1540, this time 
to counter the threats posed by the arms trade to international peace and security. 
 
It must be acknowledged, however, that even though this study provides strong evidence in 
support of its conclusion, its main weakness remains the fact that it falls short of discussing 
the possibility of the use of the veto power by any of the permanent members in the case of 
the arms trade. Resolutions 1373 and 1540 may have passed this test but that may not be the 
case for subsequent Security Council legislative resolutions. Further study is hence required 
in this regard.  
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